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RECENT CASES
VALIDITY OF COMMODITY EXCHANGE REGULATIONS
UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
Prior to May 8, 1946, grain prices were subject to price ceilings established
by the Office of Price Administration and the Secretary of Agriculture., On that
date the OPA, the Office of Economic Stabilization, and the Secretary of Agri-
culture jointly directed an increase in the maximum prices2 per bushel of certain
grains, effective on May 13, and coincident with the order the three govern-
mental agencies recommended to the governing boards of grain exchanges
throughout the nation that all futures contracts3 be settled at the previously
applicable ceiling prices. Four days later the Board of Directors of the Chicago
x Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 23 (1942), 50 U.S.C.A. App. § goi (1947).
2 The ceiling price of corn was raised 25 cents, wheat i5 cents, rye to cents, barley 9 cents,
and oats 5 cents.
3 Futures contracts are agreements to buy and receive or to sell and deliver grain during the
delivery month at a presently stipulated price, subject to the rules of the contract market.
Futures are to be distinguished from 'cash" grain transactions, which consist in the buying
and selling of grain by sample at the pits of the exchange for immediate delivery. The unit of
futures trading is 5,ooo bushels; terms of all contracts are identical; all trades must be made
at the pits of the exchange; delivery is made during the delivery month after notice of intent
to deliver has been served. Actually, less than i per cent of the futures contracts culminate in
delivery, since they are "offset" by transactions which the sellers or buyers subsequently enter
into on the exchange. All contracts must be "cleared" each day through the Clearing Corpora-
tion, which by Rule 314 of the Board becomes substituted as a seller to the buyer and as a
buyer to the seller upon all futures contracts. A clearing member who has open "long"
commitments-one who has purchased more grain than he has sold as represented by futures-
is thus a buyer from the Clearing Corporation, and conversely one who is "short" is a seller.
At the close of each day a clearing member is either net "long," net "short," or "even" with
the Clearing House, and he must settle his transactions on the basis of the daily price fluctua-
tions. If he has a net "long" position and the market advances, he gains, and he is entitled to
payment from the Clearing House; if he has a net "short" position and the market advances,
he sustains a loss and he becomes a debtor to the corporation. As defined by the Commodity
Exchange Act hedging consists in the "sale of any commodity for future delivery.., to the
extent that such sales are offset in quantity by the ownership or purchase of the same cash
commodity, or conversely purchases of any commodity for future delivery... to the extent
that such purchases are offset by sales of the same cash commodity." For example, one who,
like the plaintiff, has contracted to sell unacquired cash grain three months hence goes "long"
or buys futures in an equal amount so that if the price of cash grain increases before he ob-
tains it, his loss on the cash grain contract theoretically will be offset by his gain in the futures
market, which fluctuates in relation to the "cash" grain market. The relationship between the
"cash" and "futures" market is of course central to all hedging and speculating operations.
For an informative account of the mechanics involved in futures trading and the nature of
hedging see United States Dept. of Agriculture, Circular 15, Hedging in Grain Futures 1-32
(1931); cf. Rice v. Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247 (I947); Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262
U.S. 1 (1923); Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 (i9o4); United
States Dept. of Agriculture, Technical Bulletin 747, Grain Prices and the Futures Market
(i941); Baer and Woodruff, Commodity Exchanges (1929).
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Board of Trade promulgated Regulation 1894, which recited the request of the
government as the basis for halting trading in outstanding futures contracts
calling for delivery of grain in May, July, September, and December 1946,
except for purposes of liquidation at the old ceiling prices. Between May 13
and May 3, 1946 the directors requested the three federal agencies to issue a
directive which would replace the May 8 recommendation with a retroactive
order that the grain exchanges carry out the governmental policy which had
been expressed by the Board in Regulation 1894. But the agencies found that
they had no power to issue such an edict,4 and the request was refused. In
Regulation 1898, adopted on May 31, 1946, the Board of Directors, announcing
that they had reconsidered their previous decision of May 12, repealed that
part of Regulation 1894 which had directed settlement of the May, July,
September, and December futures at the old ceiling prices. The Board provided
further that trading in old futures outstanding as of June 1, 1946 might be
resumed at prices no higher than the ceilings which had become effective with
the price boost of May 13. Subsequently, on June 13, the Board issued Regula-
tion r899, which asserted that governmental purchases for European famine
relief would so deplete grain supplies for domestic trade as to prevent the per-
formance of futures contracts, thereby enabling purchasers of futures to compel
"liquidation at exorbitant and extortionate prices," and that as a result "an
emergency existed which would render impossible the continuance on this ex-
change of a free, open, and orderly market where hormal competitive elements
can and may operate." The Board accordingly directed that trading in July,
September, and December futures be stopped, and that such contracts be
settled without delivery on the basis of the closing prices quoted on the ex-
change as of June 13. With the expiration of OPA on June 30 the imposition of
ceiling prices on grain was terminated, and the price of "cash grain" soared.s
4 The Emergency Price Control Act expressly denied to the administrator of that act the
power to prohibit futures trading on contract markets. 56 Stat. 23 (1942), 5o U.S.C.A. App.
§ 902(e) (1947). The Commodity Exchange Act, 42 Stat. 998 (1936), 7 U.S.C.A. §i et seq.
(1939), vests no power in the Secretary of Agriculture to terminate futures or to fix the price
of defaulted contracts.
s Futures prices prevailing on the Chicago Board of Trade before and after OPA prices were
increased on May 13, 1946, and prices offered after the expiration of OPA ceilings on grain on
June 30, 1946, are shown in the following table. Regulation 1894 ordered prices settled at
rice Differentialbe-
iest P tween June 13
or C p Price and High-
May zz Price June x3 Price estPriceSu(Per Bu.) (Per Bu.) fterOPA c tsequently At
ings Lifted Grain before
End of Period
July Corn ......... 1.1l $1.461 $2.29 $.82j
September Corn ..... 1.21t 1.46j 2.29 .821December Oats ...... 83 .88 . .7
September Wheat .... 1.831 1.981 2.18 -191July Barley ......... 1.261t 1.35t 1-79 . 431
September Barley .... 1.261 2.351 '.79 .431
December Barley .... 2.261 1.351 i.89k .54
September Rye ...... 1.441 1 .s81 2.431 .83
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Had Regulation 1899 not been adopted, the value of futures contracts which
were terminated would have substantially increased. 6 Treble-damage suits were
subsequently filed by holders of futures who were "long" against the directors
of the Chicago Board of Trade and the directors of its affiliate, the Board of
Trade Clearing Corporation, charging that Regulations 1894 and 1899 consti-
tuted a conspiracy to fix prices and to restrain trade unreasonably in violation
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.7 The defendants averred that at the time of the
regulations there was in effect an "emergency rule" 8 of the Board of Trade, in-
corporated by reference in all futures contracts, which granted the Board
"lpower ... to stop trading ... in any future contracts ... by reason of any
emergency, and to make such regulations in regard to deliveries and settlement
prices as it [the Board] might deem proper." The district court dismissed the
complaints for failing to state a cause of action under the Sherman Act, and the
judgments were affirmed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled
that the two regulations terminated contracts pursuant to a lawful power of
the Board and fixed a measure of damages for liquidated agreements. Certiorari
was denied by the United States Supreme Court. Cargill, Incorporated v. Board
of Trade of the City of Chicago.9
Commodity exchange markets are not governmental agencies," ° and al-
though regulated by the Commodity Exchange Act," they have been granted
no congressional exemptions from the anti-trust laws.1" Furthermore, there is
substantial, although indirect, evidence to indicate that the Congress which
adopted the Sherman Act intended that it should apply to futures contracts.' 3
prices listed in the May ii column; Regulation 1898 reopened trading at the prices listed in
the June 13 column; and the last two columns indicate the extent to which the plaintiff's
contracts would have increased in value after expiration of OPA.
6 The Federal Trade Commission has estimated that the total increase in value of the 23
million bushels of grain which were closed out by Regulation 1899 on June 13 would have
totaled $7,569,292. See FTC, Report on Economic Effects of Grain Exchange Action Affecting
Futures Trading During First Six Months of 1946, at 49 (1947).
7 26 Stat. 209 (1890), i5 U.S.C.A. §§ I-7 (1941).
8 Rule 251, Rules and Regulations of Board of Trade of the City of Chicago.
9 164 F. 2d 820 (C.C.A. 7th, 1947), cert. den. 68 S. Ct. 912 (1948). Companion cases arising
from the same factual context and similarly decided were Belz v. Board of Trade of the City of
Chicago, 164 F. 2d 824 (C.C.A. 7th, 1947), cert. den. 68 S. Ct. 913 (1948); Daniel v. Board of
Trade of the City of Chicagi, 164 F. 2d 8r5 (C.C.A. 7th, 1947).
10 See Rice v. Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247 (1947).
"142 Stat. 998 (x936), 7 U.S.C.A. § i et seq. (1939).
1" No industry is exempt from the provisions of the Anti-Trust Act unless Congress has
expressly indicated that the Act is inapplicable. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,
324 U.S. 439, 456 (i945); United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533,
553 (I944); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 2o1 (1939).
13 When the Sherman bill was under debate in the Senate, Sen. Ingalls of Kansas proposed
an amendment which would have taxed out of existence the business of dealing in futures con-
tracts. Grain futures were specifically enumerated in the amendment which was adopted by
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But regulations and conduct by exchange markets, which, if viewed in another
context might be deemed repugnant to the Sherman Act,4 have been upheld by
the Supreme Court. In Board of Trade v. United States's the Court declared valid
the "call rule" which prohibited members of the Chicago Board of Trade from
purchasing grain "to arrive" in the hours between the closing of the exchange
one day and its opening the next day at any price other than the closing bid.
By contrast, conduct based on the articles in the trade association agreements
of sugar refiners 6 and hardwood manufacturers17 not to deviate from announced
prices has been condemned as contrary to the anti-trust statutes.
If anything is definite about contemporary monopoly law, it is the proposition
that agreements to fix prices are illegal per se.' 8 The "rule of reason"'19 has no
application to combinations operating directly on prices, even though the mem-
bers of the price-fixing group may be in no position to control the market. ° In
a very real sense the premature termination of the July, September, and De-
cember futures, coupled with the directive that they be liquidated at the existing
ceilings, constituted price fixing. Pegging the price of futures would prevent the
free interplay of the conflicting interests of sellers and buyers which causes the
the Senate without a record vote. 21 Cong. Rec. 2613 (x89o). The Sherman bill was sub-
sequently redrafted by the Senate Judiciary Committee, which used substantially the same
broad and sweeping language which Sections i and 2 of that Act contain today. Sen. Ingalls
and proponents of the Ingalls amendment supported the redrafted bill. 21 Cong. Rec. 3145,
3153 (x8go). Compare United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525 (1913) (conspiracy to run a corner
in futures on the New York Cotton Exchange violates the Sherman Act).
'4 The regulations and by-laws of an exchange when considered as a whole do not contra-
vene the anti-trust statutes. United States v. New York Coffee & Sugar Exchange, 263 U.S.
6ii (1924). State courts have also viewed individual regulations of commodity exchanges
sympathetically: State v. Duluth Board of Trade, 107 Minn. 5o6, 121 N.W. 395 (19o9) (regu-
lation providing for uniform rate of commission to be charged non-members does not violate
Minnesota anti-trust statutes); Heim v. New York Stock Exchange, 63 N.Y. Misc. 5o4, 2i8
N.Y. Supp. 591 (19o9), aff'd 138 App. Div. 96, 122 N.Y.Supp. 872 (19io) (resolution expelling
members who transact business with a rival exchange does not violate New York anti-trust
act). But cf. Pirnie Simmons & Co. v. Whitney, 144 N.Y. Misc. 812, 259 N.Y. Supp. 193 (1932)
(regulation prohibiting members from dealing with non-members who did not comply with
exchange rule regarding sale of stock by portfolios is an illegal restraint of trade).
15 246 U.S. 231 (i9i8).
x6 Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 6oi (2936).
'7 American Column and Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
is United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 3io U.S. i5o (194o); United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); Live Poultry Dealers' Protective Ass'n v. United
States, 4 F. 2d 840 (C.C.A. 2d, 2924); see United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 68 S. Ct.
915, 922 (1948); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (294o); Wholesale Dry
Goods Institute, Inc. v. FTC, x39 F. 2d 230 (C.C.A. 2d, i943); United States v. National
Wholesale Druggists' Ass'n, 6i F. Supp. 59o (N.J., i945). Some of the most troubling recent
price-fixing questions have been raised in the patent cases. See 13 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 5o4 (1946),
noting United States v. Line Material Co., 64 F. Supp. 970 (Wis., 2946), and cases cited therein.
'9 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. io6 (1911).
20 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 31o U.S. 150, 224-25 (1940).
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value of the contracts to vary from minute to minute and day to day. It was
impossible on May 12 and June 13 to assess accurately the value of the futures
contracts which would not mature until July, September, and December. And
the fact that the stabilized price was the OPA ceiling would be immaterial if
there were price fixing, since the vice is not the formula by which prices are set
but the existence of an agreement to set prices.2I
However, the Circuit Court, while recognizing the illegality of a price-fixing
combination, held that the regulations could not be regarded as price tampering,
but should be viewed as instructions to terminate, coupled with aproviso fixing
the measure of damages.22 In terms of this analysis the sellers would have been
relieved of their obligations to deliver by the doctrines of impossibility and
frustration.23 Since this was a civil suit for damages pursuant to the Clayton
Act,24 and not a proceeding initiated by the government, the plaintiff had the
burden of establishing damages proximately resulting from the defendants'
allegedly unlawful acts2 s The plaintiff argued that the impact of Regulations
1894 and 1899 was felt most sharply by grain merchants and processors like
himself, who bought futures to hedge against forward commitments for grain
or processed products.26 The action of the Board nullified the expected price
protection of their hedges, leaving them still obligated to buy cash grain at in-
creased prices to meet their commitments but without the opportunity to
"remove" their hedges as and when they acquired cash grain. But if the Board
of Trade had simply halted trading and forbidden delivery without establishing
the settlement price,'7 the plaintiff would have been deprived of the price insur-
ance provided by his hedges. In this situation, if the sellers had defaulted when
the contracts matured, the measure of damages would have been the value of
the contracts as of the date of termination, which by law could not have been in
excess of the ceiling price.25 But the ceiling price coincided with the settlement
2" Ibid., at 222.
- Cargill, Inc. v. Board of Trade, 164 F. 2d 820, 823 (C.C.A. 7th, 1947), cert. den. 68 S. Ct.
912 (1948).
'3 The defense of the sellers, if the stop order were a lawful regulation, would be similar to
that presented where performance is rendered impossible by a change of law or an adminis-
trative regulation. See Williston, Contracts §§ 1938-39 (rev. ed., 1936); Rest., Contracts
§§ 457-58 (1932). On the rights of parties where performance is prevented by war conditions,
see 137 A.L.R. 1199 (1942).
24 38 Stat. 731 (I914), i5 U.S.C.A. § IS (i94i).
25 See Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 26o U.S. i56 (r922); Beegle v. Thomson,
138 F. 2d 875 (C.C.A. 7th, 1943).
26See FTC, Report on Economic Effects of Grain Exchange Actions Affecting Futures
Trading During the First Six Months of 1946, at 5o (i947).
'7 This was the course of action taken by the Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce, which left
the settlement terms to the arms-length negotiations of the buyers and sellers. See FTC,
op. cit. supra note 26, at 63-70.
'8The entire problem of damages is rendered unusually complex by the existence of price
ceilings and speculation, set in a context of anticipatory breach and impossibility. The inability
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figure actually stipulated by the Board, so that the plaintiff's financial position
would be identical whether it was affected by the hypothetical regulation with-
out the price-fixing element or by the regulation which the Board in fact issued.
The thrust of this line of argument is that it was not the settlement provision
in the regulation-the alleged price fixing--so much as the stop-trading element
coupled with the expiration of OPA and the subsequent price spurt which
caused damage to Cargill.
Since any damages which occurred were the direct result of the stop-trading
order itself, the plaintiff was thus reduced to contending that the regulation was
an unreasonable restraint of trade. Perhaps the most potent factor which mili-
tates against the success of an action based on this premise is that the "emer-
gency rule" was drafted largely in compliance with a congressional mandate.
The Commodity Exchange Act requires as a condition precedent to recognition
as a contract market that the governing board of an exchange provide for "the
prevention of manipulation of prices and the cornering of any commodity by
the dealers or operators upon such board.'12 9 It is difficult to see how corners and
manipulation can be prevented by the governing boards if they are powerless to
close or restrict the sale of futures. 30 In addition, the general sympathy of the
courts to open market trading rules and the general circumstances under which
the Regulations were framed would attenuate the possibility of success of an
action based on unreasonable restraint.
It is dear, of course, that uncurbed exercise of the emergency power by the
governing boards could speedily demoralize the grain market and seriously dam-
age the public interest. 3' The values of a futures market in terms of lower prices
to consumers and the diffusion in the concentration of ownership in the grain
industry, made possible because of the reduction of risk through hedging opera-
tions, are widely recognized.32 If grain futures were subject to the whim and
caprice of the management of contract markets, the utility of futures would be
of the sellers (shorts) to mitigate damages after the stop-trading order would also be a relevant
consideration. While the normal measure of damages for ancitipatory breach is the value of
the contract as of the date of performance, an exception has been recognized in the case of
futures contracts where the market value of the futures as of the date of the breach may serve
as the damage index. See Samuels v. E. F. Drew & Co., 286 Fed. 278 (D.C. N.Y., 1922);
Williston, Contracts § i397 (rev. ed., x936); Sedgwick, Damages § 636-e (9th ed., Igog).
29 42 Stat. 998 (1936), 7 U.S.C.A. § iet seq. (I939).
30 See Crowley v. Commodity Exchange, i4i F. 2d 182, 185 (C.C.A. 2d, 1944); Cargill,
Inc. v. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, CEA Docket No. 6 (Aug. 14, 194o). Plaintiff
conceded that there might be some circumstances under which "emergency rule" 251 could
properly be applied. Reply brief at 4.
31 The FTC censured the Chicago Board of Trade for its "vacillating policy" in May and
June 1946, which the FTC said resulted "in severe loss of public confidence." FTC, Report on
Economic Effects of Grain Exchange Actions Affecting Futures Trading During the First
Six Months of 1946, at 8 (1947).
3See Baer & Woodruff, Commodity Exchanges, 215 (1929); Report of the Federal Trade
Commission on The Grain Trade: Effects of Future Trading, Vol. VII, at 270 (1926).
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largely destroyed, and gambling and speculation would supersede legitimate
trading.
The determination of whether or not an emergency exists is a matter re-
served to the discretion of the Board, though a stop-trading regulation passed
without the existence of a crisis would render the directors subject to the charge
of ultra-vires conduct. In the present case the evidence to support the Board's
conclusion is extremely persuasive.
At the time of enactment of the Regulations the government was engaged in
wide-scale activity to combat famine in Europe. War Food Orders I44 and I4533
compelled the sale to the Commodity Credit Corporation each week of all grain
in the possession of grain merchandisers or grain-elevator operators which had
not been sold to priority purchasers. The government offered a bonus of 3o
cents a bushel above the applicable ceiling price to induce farmers and ware-
housemen to sell corn and wheat to the Commodity Credit Corporation to be
exported for famine relief.34 The use of flour was drastically limited,35 and gray
bread appeared on bakery counters. Despite the force of these factors in reply to
the restraint of trade argument, it is well established that if the court had re-
garded the Regulations as price fixing, neither the economic necessity of a
ruinous market,36 good faith,37 nor alleged benefits to the industry and the
public would have afforded a defense.
This case is a vagary in the law, arising from a curious combination of gov-
ernmental price fixing, its removal, and the limited powers of governmental
agencies. Here, as in the Socony-Vacuum casea8 which the plaintiff cited as its
leading authority, the alleged unlawful conduct was carried out with the ap-
proval of federal officials. But the court in the Socony-Vacuum case rejected the
defendants' contention that such acquiescence or support will provide immunity
from an anti-trust charge.39 Aside from the latter issue, Cargill v. Board of Trade
is unique as the first case in which it has been urged that stop-trading regula-
tions constitute a violation of the Sherman Act. The courts have previously
rejected charges that such regulations are contrary to the constitutional protec-
tion against the impairment of the obligation of contracts, 40 or that they are an
unlawful interference with contractual rights.4' But the most far-reaching sig-
33 II Fed. Register 1761 (1946).
34 Ibid., at 4542. 3s Ibid., at 5644.
36 See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 3r0 U.S. 350, 221 (i94o); Handler, Federal
Anti-Trust Laws-A Symposium, at 91 et seq. (i93i). But cf. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v.
United States, 228 U.S. 344 (i933).
37 Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 44 (1930).
38 30 U.S. 150 (1940). 39 Ibid., at 225-28.
40 Thomson v. Thomson, 293 Ill. 584, 127 N.E. 882 (1920).
41 Garcia Sugars Corp. v. New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange, Inc., 7 N.Y.S. 2d 532
(1938), aff'd without opinion sub. nom. Rifkind v. New York Coffee & Sugar Exchange, 258
App. Div. 871, i6 N.Y.S. 2d 1023 (i939); cf. Crowley v. Commodity Exchange, 141 F. 2d 382
(C.C.A. 2d, 1944).
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nificance of this decision is that it tends to extend the life line of the unstated
exception to the anti-trust laws which the Supreme Court appears to be evolv-
ing as it confronts the regulations of auctions or open markets such as a com-
modity exchange.42 The permissible scope of these regulations is still subject to
speculation. But the drift is perceptible, and the Cargill case clearly indicates
its direction.
ENFORCEMENT OF PRIOR SUPPORT ORDER FOLLOWING
EX PARTE FOREIGN DIVORCE
In 1943 the plaintiff, Mrs. Estin, brought an action for separation in New
York in which her husband entered a general appearance. Upon a finding that
the plaintiff had been abandoned, the court awarded her $i8o a month as per-
manent alimony. Shortly thereafter the husband went to Nevada, and a year
later instituted suit for divorce in which the wife was served only by publica-
tion and made no appearance. Upon entry of the Nevada decree of absolute
divorce, the husband ceased making payments under the New York separation
decree. In Mrs. Estin's subsequent suit for arrears, the New York Court of
Appeals held that the ex parte Nevada divorce, although effective to dissolve
the marriage, did not terminate the husband's duty to support his spouse.'
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed this judgment.
Estin v. Estin.2
There was no question of the bona fides of the defendant's Nevada residence
and hence no contention that the ex parte divorce did not dissolve the marital
relationship.3 But many courts have held, as did the New York Court of
Appeals in the instant case, that the rendition of a valid foreign4 decree of
divorce, secured by one spouse upon constructive service, does not terminate the
liability to pay alimony under a prior decree for separate maintenance s The
husband here argued, despite such decisions, that the Full Faith and Credit
42 Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (i9i8); United States v. New York Coffee
& Sugar Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 6xi (1924).
x Estin v. Estin, 296 N.Y. 308,73 N.E. 2d 113 (i947), noted in 47 Col. L. Rev. io69 (I947).
2 68 S. Ct. 12 r3 (1948). Justices Frankfurter and Jackson wrote dissenting opinions. See also
the companion case of Kreiger v. Kreiger, 68 S. Ct. 1221 (1948), in which the same two justices
dissented.
3 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942), 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
4 The term "foreign" as used herein applies to sister states.
s Estin v. Estin, 296 N.Y. 308, 73 N.E. 2d 113 (1947); Security Trust Co. v. Woodward
73 F. Supp. 667 (N.Y., 1947); Basset v. Basset, 41 F. 2d 954 (C.C.A. 9th, 1944), cert. den. 323
U.S. 718 (i944); Durlacher v. Durlacher, 123 F. 2d 70 (C.C.A. 9 th, i94i), cert. den. 315 U.S.
805 (1942); Metzger v. Metzger, 32 Ohio App. 202, 167 N.E. 69o (1929); Miller v. Miller, 200
Iowa 1193, 206 N.W. 262 (1925); Simonton v. Simonton, 4o Idaho 751, 236 Pac. 863 (1925);
Dorey v. Dorey, 248 Mass. 359, 142 N.E. 774 (1924); 3 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment § 32.48
(2d ed., 1945); see Barber v. Barber, 21 How. (U.S.) 582 (1858); Bennet v. Tomlinson, 206
Iowa 1075, 221 N.W. 837 (1928).
